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Abstract: Public-Private Partnership has been employed in some local 
governments in Malaysia for some time in real estate development making 
local authorities a key player in the economic development of cities. 
However, little research exists on both the implementation of such projects 
and the evaluation of the governance procedures. This paper seeks to fill 
this gap by examining the working arrangement between selected local 
authorities and developers in striking a win-win situation. Towards this end, 
the paper examines the working arrangements between two local authorities 
and developers in Batu Pahat and Kuantan, as well as the subsequent post-
project developments. The two cases in Kuantan exemplify successful 
partnerships that still exist while the third in Batu Pahat illustrates a failed 
partnership.
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1.  Introduction 
Public-private partnership (PPP) has existed in Malaysia, at least since the 
mid-1980s under joint-venture arrangements between local government and 
developers. PPP is often confused with privatization but both terms are quite 
clearly distinguishable in Malaysia. PPP is seen as a derivative of privatization 
(Pongsiri, 2002: 488), a concept that emerged under the administration of 
Mahathir Mohamad who emulated the initiative of Margaret Thatcher in 
the United Kingdom. Accordingly, the Malaysia Incorporated Policy was 
launched on 25 February 1983 followed by the Privatization Policy on 19 
March 1983. The latter is a tool used to implement the former. Today, the 
term privatization has eroded as it is slowly being replaced by the term private 
financing initiative. 
In the past, PPP in Malaysia was subjected to a traditional view and 
perceived to be a derivative of the privatization policy but of late, it denotes 
private sector involvement in public infrastructure development. However, the 
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Privatization Masterplan issued by the Prime Minister’s Department has failed 
to be an important guide for the implementation of the policy at the local 
government level. This is made worse as local government forms the third tier 
in the three-tier government structure in Malaysia, and local governments are 
subject to scrutiny and subordination by state governments, which form the 
second tier. The Economic Planning Unit (1991) appears to be a useful guide 
for federal and state level large projects and is less friendly to local govern-
ment initiatives. The projects at local government level are usually minute as 
compared to those undertaken by the federal and state governments.
In addition, there is a paucity of literature, at least in Malaysia, that evalu-
ates the outcomes of the exercise after a few years of implementation. Such 
being the case, this study contributes to much needed literature in the field. 
However, a preliminary study was documented for the Kuantan experience 
under the auspices of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Konrad Adenauer 
Foundation, 2000) as activities around ASEAN and East Asian countries. 
This paper focuses on PPP with special reference to three examples 
from two local authorities in Peninsular Malaysia. The paper perceives the 
PPP exercise to be analogous to a marriage between local authorities and 
their private partners, and intends to demonstrate that the marriage can be 
successful given good leadership who are committed and personally involved 
to take the long-term initiative through. As such, the writer intentionally 
researched on examples of PPP successes and failures in a bid to make 
reasonable comparisons and obtain valuable lessons. 
The paper begins with an examination of the literature surrounding 
the concept of PPP, and the confusion it faces with the term privatization. 
This is followed by a description of the methodology used in the study, 
and the experiences of the Kuantan and Batu Pahat Municipal Councils in 
implementing PPP. The paper concludes with a discussion on the experiences 
of both councils, and the lessons learnt.
2.  Review of Related Literature 
Governments are inevitably faced with the problem of a rise in the demand for 
better services and to provide these with the limited revenue resources avail-
able (Kolderie, 1984). Possible options to obtain revenues are to raise taxes 
and reduce expenditure; however, the former will receive serious objections 
from the people. Consequently, there has been a push to privatize services due 
to fiscal difficulty in sustaining services, and the pressure by donor agencies as 
a result of the slow pace of privatization and commercialization in developing 
countries (Batley, 1996). But contrary to the fear of civil servants, the role of 
public agencies does not cease to exist after privatization; rather, there is a 
change in role and ownership (Batley, 1996; Sundquist, 1984). 
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Although privatization was initiated under Thatcher, PPP has been 
used quite freely to imply the involvement of the private sector in its bid 
to cooperate with the government sector towards mutual concerns. The key 
concept then was that PPP involves a win-win situation for all parties in the 
collaboration. Partnership implies the agreement to work together to perform 
some tasks, taking the view that there may be hiccups which can be ironed 
out. Moreover, it emphasizes the need for good principal-agent relation-
ship (Davis, 2005). However, there is confusion in the application of both 
terms, namely, privatization and PPP, and the literature in the field is clearly 
indicative of this confusion (Mitchell-Weaver and Manning, 1991; Jamali, 
2004). In both terminologies, and in most cases, the asset is returned to the 
government at the end of a concession period. Broadly, Sanjeev (2008) defines 
PPP as “an agreement between the public and private sector to work together, 
allocating resources, risks and rewards between the partners” and views risk-
sharing to be a key attribute of PPP. PPP also synergizes the outcomes of 
exploring untapped potentials in various areas, such as investment, that public 
agencies are unable to perform.
In the United Kingdom, PPP is seen as a partnership to develop public 
infrastructure with a private entrepreneur financing the project. In line with 
Engel, Fischer and Galetovic (2008), this means that the concessionaire will 
manage and control the assets in exchange for user fees to compensate for 
all its costs. The asset is to revert completely to the government once the 
concession period ends (Grimsey and Lewis, 2002). This provides the space 
to argue that PPP is similar to privatization, but the traditional thinking is that 
PPP is a subset of privatization. Interestingly, the national treasury of South 
Africa (www.ppp.gov.za) defines PPP in terms of what it is not, that is, not 
as outsourcing of functions where the institution retains substantial financial, 
technical and operational risk; not a private donation for public good; not a 
commercialization by creating a state enterprise; and does not require states 
to borrow. This definition may eliminate some of the items currently being 
described as PPP by the literature.
Linder (1999: 36) distinguishes both PPP and privatization in that the 
former entails cooperation and joint venture. Although Engel, Fischer and 
Galetovic (2008) argue that PPP cannot be justified just because they free 
public funds, they suggest that PPP are closer to public provision than 
to privatization. They claim that PPP “bundles” investment and service 
provision in a single long-term contract. However, PPP may entail shifts in 
accountability arrangements and the need for reporting, and therefore a well-
defined regulatory framework is essential (Pongsiri, 2002). However, Pongsiri 
also cautioned the possibility of over-regulation and warned that contractual 
safeguards would restrain economic growth and limit the private sector’s 
ability to remain competitive.
IJIE vol2-2 Kuppusamy.indd   144 8/20/2010   1:30:51 PMPPP – Local Government and Private Sector in Malaysia      145
Savas (2000) keeps to the conventional belief by viewing PPP as a 
form of privatization and contracting-out where the private sector and the 
government develop a capital-intensive infrastructure using mostly private 
financing, and subsequently operate under concession by the private partner 
for a stipulated period of time. Indeed, PPP has been seen to develop and 
demonstrate new and effective ways of addressing public problems (Kolderie, 
1984). Furthermore, if PPP is successful, it would be possible to attract other 
business entities to attempt similar ventures. However, Wettenhall (2003: 82-
83) criticizes that partnership has been loosely connected with privatization, 
outsourcing, contracting out, commercialization and anything to do with 
public-private mix. He examined the literature based on the view that PPP is 
an extension from public enterprise into privatization, and posted the view that 
the term PPP is often mixed-up with variants of privatization. 
The move to formalize privatization is receding in a number of developed 
countries. For instance, in the United Kingdom, the term private financing 
initiative (PFI) has rather been used in place of privatization since 1992 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003). PFI takes the form of design-build-finance-
operate which is quite similar to the definition of PPP. In fact, Broadbent and 
Laughlin (2003) and Hodge and Greve (2007) think that PFI and PPP are 
synonymous. However, Allen (2001) states that PFI is distinguishable from 
privatization as the public sector still retains a major stake in the projects; 
which is not feasible under privatization. Departing from Allen (2001), 
Glaister (1999) accepts PPP as a part of PFI. He terms both of them as being 
just two forms of best practices, and examines the abuses and uses of private 
financing and PPP in the transportation sector in London. He claims that PPP 
has evolved from PFI as a form of procuring services of the private sector 
providers and lately has incarnated into what is called PPP under the Labour 
government. This is quite contrary to the earlier discussion that PFI comes 
after PPP. 
The foregoing discussion can be summarized and illustrated as in Figure 
1 which shows the evolution of the perception of PPP from the traditional 
(left) to the modern (far right), where the notion of privatization appears to be 
subsumed under the concepts of both PPP and PFI. In the middle, the diagram 
shows the multiplicity of all the terms, and the resultant confusion. 
Grimsey and Lewis (2004) elaborate on the various issues that may 
emerge from contract management in a PPP initiative. These include service 
delivery problems and availability, and a string of risks involving the public: 
assets, operations, sponsors, financial and default risks. They also highlight 
the fact that many do not take into account the long term risks that the public 
sector will have to take charge of when the asset is returned to the government 
(and it is during this time that the assets require huge maintenance costs and 
more attention). Hodge and Coghill (2007) compared three infrastructure 
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development projects involving privatization, one of which is PPP, in Victoria, 
Australia. They conclude that there would be lower political accountability 
in contrast with higher managerial and market accountability. Privatization 
entails transferring of risks, especially financial, to the private sector. 
They also highlight that accountability to the people in providing public 
infrastructure erodes when it becomes private, and stress that there is a serious 
need to maximize transparency and accessibility to information. One of the 
strongest points of PPP is the existence of a strong organizational and financial 
relationship between the public and private sector operators, especially 
involving joint-ventures, joint stock companies and joint development projects 
(Hodge and Greve, 2007). 
Li et al. (2005) list the types of PPP that befits UK as assets sales, 
wider market, sales of business, partnership companies, PFI, joint ventures, 
partnership investments, and policy partnership. This list is comprehensive 
and applies also to Malaysia.
2.1  Partnership at Local Government Level
Partnership programmes are evident in urban renewal initiatives involving 
local governments and entrepreneurs (see Batley, 1996). Batley’s (1996) study 
find that services are more effective after privatization. Wettenhall (2003) cites 
the Dutch example with a similar intention and the role of local government in 
urban development. Wan and Noor (2005) find that partnership programmes 
in providing public housing in Kuala Lumpur have been successful. Likewise, 
Figure 1:  The Locus of PPP
Note:   PN – Privatization; PPP – Public private partnership; PFI – Private 
financing initiative.
Source:  Author.
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Dato’ Mohamad et al. (2000) exhibit a set of examples initiated in Kuantan 
that were deemed to be successful at the time. The Kuantan initiatives were 
part of an international network on PPP involving sister-cities under the 
auspices of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation of Germany. 
Despite its popular inception in Europe, PPP is not always successful. 
Examples from the Netherlands have shown that PPPs are not practical, 
particularly as partners are confronted with the difficulty of making joint 
decisions, and the organization tend to revert to traditional forms, that is, 
contracting out and separating the responsibilities (Klijn and Teisman, 
2003). One of the reasons for the failures is expectations of large scale 
private investment in PPP. However, Klijn and Teisman (2003) claim that 
some weaknesses appeared at the last stage where squatters were offered 
opportunities to purchase housing units without the need to verify their 
eligibility, which is an important policy in public housing. This led to 
ineligible persons owning low cost houses that was meant only for those in 
the lower income category (Wan and Noor, 2005). The success of PFI/PPP 
in the transport sector depends purely on the comprehension of the policies 
concerned with it and a greater involvement of local authorities in future 
(Glaister, 1999).
Li et al. (2005) conducted a comprehensive empirical study on PPP/PFI 
projects in the United Kingdom construction sectors and found the key factors 
that emerge from their study were committed public agency, shared authority, 
cost-benefit analysis, stakeholder relationships, and strong private consortium. 
Among these, strong private consortium, appropriate risk allocation as well 
as available financial market were the most important factors. Heymans and 
Schur (1999) further stress the ingredients to successful implementation of 
PPP in the construction sector are “policy reform, legislative change, and 
robust public financial management”. 
Jamali (2004) cites the work of Gidman et al. (1995) to distinguish PPP 
from privatization (see Figure 2). The diagram distinguishes the role of the 
government from one of a provider into one of an enabler and regulator in the 
process. This is particularly crucial especially in the PPP undertaking by local 
governments where the idea of joint cooperation has shifted from one that 
is purely a contract given out to joint-ventures (which are relatively popular 
now), to the other extreme where public sector involvement is passive. In this 
regard, the involvement of the public sector is lowest when it forms passive 
involvement to becoming a regulator and enabler.
According to Batley (1996), little has been done to evaluate the perfor-
mance of privatized entities, except in the fields of solid waste collection, 
and water and electricity supply. Likewise, literature in the field shows scant 
attention to the processes that are involved in the PPP. The only notable work 
is that of Fischbacher and Beaumont (2003). 
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In this paper, the focus is on the processes involved in the PPP projects 
involving local governments in two cities in Peninsular Malaysia. PPP is taken 
as a tool for cooperation between local government and the private sector to 
develop properties for the local government without any cost. On the contrary, 
such cooperation will be able to derive some revenue for the local government 
and enable the private partners to conduct profitable commercial activities. 
This is possible with PPP.
2.2  Government and Political Will
Local governments fall into the third tier of government in the federation 
of Malaysia with the federal government taking the first tier and state 
governments the second. Under the federal constitution, local government 
comes under the direct supervision of the second tier government. Although 
elections had been held at the local government level even before it was 
extended to the federal and state levels, it was suspended at the local 
government level beginning 2 March 1965. Since then, the councillors for 
each of the 145 local authorities in the country are appointed by the ruling 
government affiliated political parties. The president of the local authority is 
appointed from among civil servants at the federal or state civil service. This 
justifies the use of the term “local authority” as being more appropriate than 
“local government” in Malaysia.
Figure 2:  Dimensions of Possible Relationships Involving Public-Private 
  Sector Partnership
Source: Gidman et al. (1995).
IJIE vol2-2 Kuppusamy.indd   148 8/20/2010   1:30:52 PMPPP – Local Government and Private Sector in Malaysia      149
The appointment of local authority presidents has serious implications on 
the quality of leadership and service they provide to the local authorities. Presi-
dents are expected to deliver exemplary results for the local authorities, but in 
practice only some leaders stand-out. These leaders could even spur economic 
growth in the city when others would leave it for natural economic factors 
to do so. There are some who have resorted to PPP as an effort to stimulate 
real estate development and economic growth. Some even look at this as an 
important measure to raise one-off revenue. Nevertheless, the president would 
have to submit the proposal to the council for endorsement before the plan is 
submitted to the state government for approval. Many other local authorities 
do not venture into PPP mainly due to lack of will, experience and zest in 
the leadership. Besides, the Privatization Master Plan issued by the Prime 
Minister’s Department does not match the needs of the local authorities.
Political interventions in the implementation of PPP projects are always 
present. However, the local authority must adhere and practice strict compli-
ance to rules and regulations. Political pressure may emerge from federal or 
state levels, most of the time as an attempt to influence the local authority 
president to accept a particular tender for the project. This forms another 
reason why most local authority presidents refrain from becoming active. 
However, in Malaysia, if a policy (including privatization) fails, it is common 
that civil servants are blamed. In fact, this can extend further if the privatiza-
tion process crumbles completely. However, the cases discussed below do not 
deal with initiatives from politicians but of the local authority leaders who 
have the ability to lead the cooperation between the local authorities and the 
private sector.
3.  Methodology
This study entailed an investigation into the details and processes involved in 
the PPP exercise at two local authorities in the peninsula, namely the Kuantan 
Municipal Council (KMC) and the Batu Pahat Municipal Council (BPMC), 
located at the Pahang and Johor states, respectively. The former also operates 
in the state capital of Pahang, turning the KMC into a key agency in the state 
capital in ensuring excellent and efficient urban services and development. 
Compared to BPMC, KMC on one hand is able to garner much support from 
the state administration particularly due to its position as the state capital 
administrator. On the other hand, Batu Pahat is a city that is comparable in 
population size to Kuantan. However, since it is quite a distance from Johor 
Bahru, the state capital of Johor, it is rendered less influential in getting 
special attention, unlike Kuantan.
The study uses both primary and secondary sources of data. KMC was 
chosen because the researcher was directly involved in documenting unfolding 
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events of PPP which subsequently heralded the sister-city concept. This 
was later published in 2000 by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation based in 
the Philippines. This material has become the secondary source for KMC. 
The document exemplify PPP experiences in East and Southeast Asian local 
governments. Malaysia was represented by KMC, led by Dato’ Mohamad 
bin Saib, the former president of the council. KMC also received a string of 
other accolades under his leadership, including some which are internationally 
recognized. A revisit to the initiatives would examine whether the initiatives 
continued even though the leadership of the council has changed. The former 
president subsequently became the Director General of the Department of 
Local Government under the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, 
Malaysia. Since retirement, he has made Kuantan his retirement home and 
is consistently in touch with the staff of KMC. Most of the primary sources 
of information were obtained from Dato’ Mohamad bin Saib and through 
contacts with various officers in KMC.
BPMC was chosen after a search for a local authority with similar 
involvement in property based PPP initiatives. The search was initiated at 
the Kluang Municipal Council, but it was soon realized that their initiatives 
do not fit into the PPP concept employed in this paper. The search in Kluang 
directed the researcher to BPMC which was claimed to have had a bad 
experience in PPP (which fulfilled the intention of this paper). In the case 
of BPMC, permission to do the study was granted by its president. Hence, 
a few personal meetings were held with the officer who was involved in the 
PPP initiative to provide primary source data for BPMC, while concession 
agreement documents formed its secondary source of data.
4.  Case Studies
This section examines the dynamics of the initiative between two local 
authorities and developers in Batu Pahat and Kuantan municipal area 
councils, as well as the subsequent post-project developments observed. 
The case studies clearly depict the successes and the failures from the PPP 
exercise.
4.1  PPP in Kuantan
Kuantan, with a population of 403,416 in 2005, is the capital city of Pahang 
and is located at the Eastern coast of Peninsular Malaysia. KMC sees PPP 
as a means to boost privatization in areas under its jurisdiction. Similarly, 
privatization of land development is seen as an effective tool to enhance its 
function as a planning authority as well as the administrator of the city. It had, 
in the past, a number of joint ventures with the private sector which entailed 
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the concept of PPP (Dato’ Mohamad et al., 2000). In the two examples that 
follow, it can be seen that PPP has been a success in Kuantan. A number of 
PPP exercises have been initiated by KMC as a result of its confidence in PPP. 
However, in all the cases under its jurisdiction, the two key factors are land 
availability and initiatives led by its leadership. 
The objectives set by KMC with regard to PPP initiatives are: (i) to 
spearhead development of infrastructure projects to enhance the quality of 
living and lifestyle of residents; (ii) to explore socioeconomic investment 
through privatization by creating business and job opportunities; (iii) to reduce 
dependency on tax revenues to finance urban services; and (iv) to support 
investment inflow into Kuantan. All these depict the proactive role of the local 
authority in influencing economic growth in the city.
Being part of the civil service, the management of KMC took special 
note of being accused of corruption if they work together with the private 
sector. Hence, tender procedures and selection of developers were given 
special attention. KMC either called for an open tender for projects identified 
or invited proposals from developers on a “first-come-first-served” basis. 
The procedure involved in the PPP listed in this paper entails the former, as 
illustrated in Figure 3. 
The activity involving privatization at the local authority is closely vetted, 
especially by the state government, which acts as the statutory guardian of 
local authorities. This is to safeguard the interests of the public with regard 
to the services provided by the local authorities and avoid projects that are 
wasteful. The involvement of the federal government, through the Economic 
Planning Unit of the Prime Minister’s Department, is to ensure that procedures 
comply with guidelines already set by the Unit in 1985.
In addition, KMC also vets the background of the company including 
appraising its management expertise, financial strength, intention of the 
proposed development projects, strategies to be used in marketing the 
products, and viability prior to awarding the contract to the successful 
bidder. The returns and benefits to all parties concerned are stipulated in the 
contract.
Kuantan has been known to be a strong advocate of PPP. This can be seen 
in a number of projects. To portray the PPP exercise in Kuantan, this paper 
examines KMC’s experience through two specific cases.
 
The Development of Kuantan Centre Point
The Kuantan Centre Point involves a two-acre plot of land located in Jalan 
Hj. Abdul Rahman in the central business district. The land was purchased 
from the state government for a nominal value of RM1,000, and originally 
housed a temporary town bus station with nine units of food stalls and 20 
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units of petty trading stalls. The stalls were previously built by KMC: the 
food stalls were rented out to operators and the petty trader stalls were leased 
en bloc to a private enterprise for a three-year term. The areas around the 
land are owned by the Pahang State Economic Development Corporation. 
As large shopping complexes sprang up in the neighbouring lands, KMC 
felt that the two-acre plot should also be redeveloped. However, the local 
authority had neither the financial capacity to build using its own resources 
nor the expertise to be a developer. As a result, it planned to enter into a 
PPP with the private sector. This venture received the approval of the state 
government. At the Full Board meeting in December 1995, the management 
suggested that the re-development plan should focus on encouraging small 
and medium scale enterprises in addition to letting office space that was very 
much in demand then.
Figure 3:  Tender Procedures for Bidding
Step Activity
1 Endorsement of the privatization project and related policies in Full Board meeting
2 Endorsement of project by State and Federal Government
3 Privatization Committee vets the tender documents
4 Privatization Unit advertises the project, calls for interested parties
5 Interested developers submit proposal
6 Privatization Committee at LA opens the tender box after deadline
7 Privatization Committee selects the best proposal based on a set of criteria and 
endorses all conditions of the offer
8 Full Board meeting endorses decision of Privatization Committee and agrees to 
award the project to the selected developer
9 Privatization Committee endorses the draft agreement prepared by the developer
10 Full Board meeting decides on the Agreement
11 State Government meeting endorses the privatization project and the development 
plan
12 Signing the agreement between KMC and the developer at Full Board meeting
Note:   LA - Local Authority.
Source:  Dato’ Mohamad bin Saib et al. (2000: 115).
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KMC subsequently invited interested parties to submit their pre-
qualification open tender through an advertisement in local newspapers. Of 
the 20 companies that showed interest, only five were shortlisted, and given 
time to submit their proposals. The proposals were required to show designs 
for food court, business and office lots, stipulate returns to KMC and estimate 
post-development value of the property. Among other things examined in the 
proposals were aspects such as layout and building plans, furnishing, returns 
to KMC, benefit to residents/communities, viability of project and features of 
company background. The developer’s background (financial and experience) 
and each item above were assigned some points, the sum of which forms the 
total score for the proposer. It was decided that the proposal that received the 
highest points would be awarded the project. 
EDSB (full name withheld for confidentiality) was awarded the project, 
and the decision to select this company was approved by the council’s 
management and the Full Board meeting. The proposal was to construct a 
RM57 million business complex consisting of three blocks. In addition, the 
developer was to construct the required number of stalls on a temporary 
site to relocate entrepreneurs currently operating in the complex. Returns to 
KMC were projected to be 15% of project value, that is, RM9.9 million. In 
addition, KMC was allocated office space from the fifth to the eighth floor in 
the complex. 
In order to ensure that the envisaged physical development took place 
within the stipulated time, the developer was required to place a bond of 
RM22,800 with KMC in addition to a bank guarantee of RM1 million and 
the director’s personal guarantee. Furthermore, a fine of RM2,280 per day 
in delay completing the project was also imposed in the contract. Above all, 
under no condition was the developer allowed to mortgage the property to 
secure a loan.
In order to ensure financial sustainability and accountability, all proceeds 
from the sales of the property were to be deposited into a common account. 
Expenditures incurred requiring payment from the account were endorsed 
by both the developer and the KMC as signatories. The developer was also 
required to produce monthly reports on the progress of the project to KMC, 
and this was to include areas such as finance, progress of development and 
delays.
Besides the need to strictly comply with approved plans, meetings were 
held fortnightly with the developer’s team to identify bottlenecks and hitches 
in the construction process. The project commenced in June 1996 and was 
duly completed with the issuance of Certificate of Fitness of Occupancy in 
December 1998. After this date, the developer began to work on the manage-
ment of the complex, and was allowed to charge tenants as provided for in the 
contract. The developer was also responsible for promoting the complex.
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To date, there appears to be no setback in the relationship between KMC 
and the management of the complex. KMC receives more than RM230,000 
per year as rental from the units given to it. Revenue from licensing and 
assessment taxes adds to this figure. 
Renovation and Leasing Part of Kuantan Central Market
Supermarkets in Kuantan in the early 1990s were relatively small in size 
and none exceeded a built-up area of over 20,000 square feet. The range 
of products offered in the supermarkets was limited and expensive. Many 
residents chose to travel to Kuala Lumpur or Singapore to purchase quality 
goods, furniture, fittings and appliances. 
Acknowledging the lack of economic attractiveness in Kuantan, KMC 
mooted an idea to renovate the market. Some of the problems were traders 
operating market and food stalls under conditions that were not hygienic, and 
the place was quite disorganized. This scenario posed a serious problem to the 
municipality and needed quick remedies. However, KMC was not willing to 
use part of its revenue to cover the cost of introducing any new development. 
Once again, PPP was seen as the plausible solution. As Ocean (Kuantan) Sdn. 
Bhd. (OKSB) was a tenant operating and occupying the largest commercial 
space on the first floor of the market complex, a contract was awarded to the 
tenant to renovate the market, including building a new block, renovating the 
first floor of the market as well as to construct 138 petty-trading stalls nearby, 
bearing a total construction value of RM5 million. There was therefore no 
necessity for a tender process or the involvement of “first-come-first-served” 
basis proposals. Upon completion, OKSB was given a lease to operate a 
supermarket exceeding 100,000 square feet for 15 years. The supermarket 
was the largest in Kuantan then. KMC received RM39,000 per month from 
the lease, excluding taxes and revenue from licensing.
With the development, the marketplace became pleasant and provided 
more earning opportunities for petty traders. Later, OKSB sold its stake to 
The Store – a supermarket chain. To counter the inception of the new “large 
supermarket”, some smaller complexes operating in Kuantan were naturally 
forced to renovate and upgrade their facilities for survival. Others moved into 
larger shopping complexes. People benefited from this development and the 
spate of economic growth that emerged.
However, the rental of space was low since the inception of the new “large 
supermarket”. Towards the end of the 15-year lease period, KMC realized it 
was time to review the rental value of the property to be commensurate 
with the current market rate. Faced with this new demand, there was initial 
resentment from the private sector partners. After some negotiations, both 
parties accepted the terms and a win-win situation prevailed. As KMC acted 
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as an agent of development, it secured a higher rental value of RM55,000 per 
month beginning 2009 while the operator was given a longer concession to 
operate.
In both cases above, there was an external force that impacted on the 
relationship between the parties involved in the PPP exercise. During the 
Asian recession period in the late 1990s, businesses were badly affected 
including those in Kuantan. Vacant commercial lots increased and the complex 
and supermarket that underwent the PPP exercise were also affected.
However, KMC began to take proactive steps to help the operators of 
both premises. Using its close relationship with public agencies operating 
in Kuantan, it began to attract them to move into the affected premises. A 
strategy to achieving this involves hosting events such as cultural shows and 
expositions that attracted more customers to the complex. To help further, 
KMC also offered discounts on rentals, not only in the two premises but also 
in other business enterprises.
PPP has certainly been fruitful and beneficial to KMC in terms of its 
revenue. Of about RM92 million obtained by KMC as total revenue in 2008, 
RM2.5 million (2.7% of total revenue) was obtained from PPP activities. 
At the same time, PPP has shown to be a smart contributor to KMC in 
developing and spurring economic growth in Kuantan and at the same time, 
reducing domestic leakage in spending elsewhere. Today, Kuantan boasts of 
a number of large shopping complexes that attract people from surrounding 
areas, including the southern part of neighbouring state of Terengganu. This 
can be witnessed on Fridays when many people from Terengganu travel to 
shop at Kuantan.
4.2  PPP in Batu Pahat
This case study relates to the Menara Majlis Perbandaran located at Jalan 
Rogayah in Batu Pahat, a city in Johor with a population of 363,413 in 2005. 
The site was formerly a bus station that was badly disorganized as buses and 
taxis were parked haphazardly, with a number of hawker stalls that cater for 
passengers scattered around. In addition, the site was deemed underdeveloped 
as the surrounding areas and within the bus station was unclean and not 
attractive. The BPMC which owned the land felt the need to redevelop the 
site to ensure a systematic traffic system. Also, there was a need to move 
hawkers into the complex to ensure that their operations do not obstruct traffic 
flow. Thus, the BPMC decided that there was a need to redevelop a 15-storey 
complex which was to house bus bays, taxi stands, food stalls, public vehicle 
parking space and office lots. The council itself did not have the financial 
resources required to rebuild a complex of this size. Even if it did, approval 
from the state government was necessary before the resources could be 
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utilized for this purpose, and quite often, this approval was not easy to obtain. 
The other option would be to apply to the federal government to fund the 
development. However, federal funds for development are usually given to 
build infrastructure and utilities as well as to maintain the existing facilities, 
and funds provided cannot be commensurate with the size of funds required 
for redevelopment. In addition, local authorities would normally refrain from 
opting for commercial loans [which was allowed by the Local Government 
Act 1976 (Act 171)] supported by the state or federal governments. Thus, the 
BPMC decided to privatize the project.
The objectives of the BPMC in the PPP initiative were: (i) to redevelop 
the existing facilities to be more organized and to provide a public transporta-
tion hub facility in the city; and (ii) to encourage better economic activities 
around and within the building.
In this exercise, the council entered a direct negotiation agreement 
with a private developer ABEEI (full name withheld for confidentiality) 
based on the PPP concept (see Figure 4). As mentioned earlier, leaders of 
public organizations in Malaysia can opt for direct negotiations or one that 
is based on open tender.2 In the BPMC, obviously the former was chosen, 
most likely because of the relative simplicity of the process and the known 
track records of the private sector party. In a direct negotiation, it is usually 
Figure 4:  Flow Chart of Procedure in the PPP Activity at BPMC Centre
LA offers intent through direct negotiation
LA submits decision to State Government for approval
Approval from State Government
LA processes the documentations
LA presents decision to Full Board Meeting
LA offers to the successful bidder
Source: Author.
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accepted that the negotiating private sector party must have the necessary 
expertise to undertake the required service delivery for the government 
(Heymans and Schur, 1999). Based on the reputation and the success story 
of ABEEI, especially in one of the many cases involving PPP in Kuantan – a 
bus terminal project (Dato’ Mohamad bin Saib et al. 2000) – the management 
was determined that the developer would be in the best position to take up 
the offer. Both parties closed an unthinkable 60-year concession agreement 
in 1993 where the council land became the collateral. The developer was to 
construct, develop and complete the development using his own resources. 
The concession period appears to be too long, as if the management and 
the council are placing liabilities on the next few generations to handle the 
project during their times. This is very peculiar when compared to many 
international experiences that usually cover between 20 and 30 years only 
(Hodge and Greve, 2007). The cases in Malaysia usually require the bidders 
to propose a comprehensive plan of the project as it is believed that the 
private sector is more innovative and able to propose innovative ideas. This 
is supported as they have more resources. Also, the architects, engineers 
and town planners at the local authority are unwilling to take the full 
responsibility to propose a plan, which may be subject to public scrutiny and 
embarrassment later. Besides, local authorities are usually short of qualified 
planners.
The developer produced the proposed design which was vetted by the 
management and duly approved by the Full Board council meeting and the 
state government. BPMC facilitated assistance by accelerating the approval 
process of the development plan. Continuous discussions were held with 
the developer (especially the engineers) to facilitate progress, and numerous 
stumbling blocks were jointly addressed by both parties. The council also 
monitored the progress and advised the developer during the development 
process.
The developer gave an assurance that the council would gain substantially 
by this initiative. Upon completion of the construction, the developer built 25 
bus bays on the ground floor, 60 units of food stalls on the third floor and 79 
taxi bays on the fourth floor to the council. None of these, except the food 
stalls, earned revenue for the council, and even then it was only a meagre 
amount that was charged for licensing. The units that carried more commercial 
value, that is, the remaining floor spaces, were assigned to the developer (see 
Table 1). In this sense, the agreement appears to be lopsided in favour of the 
developer. The local authority was glad that previous social and infrastructural 
problems associated with the building were able to be addressed by the 
undertaking. It is believed that the local authority did not place great emphasis 
on immediate financial returns. This reflected a lower expectation from PPP 
by the BPMC when compared to the cases in Kuantan.
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One of the perks assigned to BPMC was that profits from the car parks 
managed by the developer were shared 60:40 with the council taking the 
largest share. The complex is to be owned by the council after 60 years. The 
developer had the right to sell the property that has been assigned to ABEEI. 
In practice, only 14 storeys were completed. The office spaces on the 7th to 
the 12th floors were rented out. The council purchased four floors (11th to the 
14th) for RM4 million as stated in the agreement, and was to pay management 
fee after completion of the construction. Some of the remaining floors have 
been rented out by the developer, but some continue to be vacant to date. 
ABEEI maintained the property as the caretaker prior to the passing of the 
Commissioner of Buildings Act (COB) in 2008, although the agreement 
made both the council and the developer as joint caretakers. The COB Act 
2008 required public properties such as this complex to set up a management 
corporation and an independent account with membership comprising owners 
of the property, including ABEEI and the council.3 
Problems in the “marriage” began to emerge in 1996. Firstly, the council 
failed to pay the developer a management fee. The council justified its action 
with the claim that it had not occupied the premises and therefore, not liable to 
pay the management fee until they occupy the premises later. This is awkward 
as it is common for councils to charge property owners assessment tax even 
when the building is under construction. In response, the developer declined 
to pay assessment tax due to the council. The management fee was to start 
from 1996 and total management fee now exceeds total assessment tax due 
to the council.4 The council charged tax from the date the certificate of fitness 
was approved for the complex, that is, from the beginning of 1996.
BPMC could only collect taxes from units sold to private investors and 
occupants. The council was willing to move to the complex with the view to 
catalyze the shifting of other interested parties into the complex, including 
private enterprises, government agencies and others who may be interested 
in occupying the office spaces. It has to be noted that the council has been 
Table 1:  Floor Spaces Assigned to Developer
Floor  Use  Floor Space (sq. ft.)
Ground Floor  Shopping complex  13,800
1st Floor  Shopping complex  41,232
2nd Floor  Shopping complex  40,735
3rd Floor  Shopping complex  22,147
4th Floor  Shopping complex  19,026
5th and 6th Floor  271 units of parking bays 
7th to 15th Floor  Office space
Source: Author.
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occupying the 11th to the 14th floors, which they had purchased for RM4 
million, since 2006.5 However, ABEEI was said to be unwilling to negotiate 
further and had no marketing plans to persuade interested parties to move 
into the complex.
ABEEI has offered to take over the ownership and management of the 
whole complex, but BPMC could not accept the offer as it would involve a 
significant overrun of its funds. As a counter reaction, the council took legal 
action against the developer in 2008. The developer claimed that their non-
payment was due to the council’s failure in paying the management fee. 
ABEEI has also been facing problems with customers and other tenants 
in the complex. Due to lack of confidence in the management and lack of 
cleanliness in the complex, many tenants refused to settle the management 
fee. As a result, ABEEI did not settle electricity bills with Tenaga Nasional 
Berhad (TNB), the national electricity supplier. This resulted in TNB dis-
connecting power supply to the common areas that affect customers and 
tenants of the complex.6 Elevator services were disrupted and the lifts were 
not maintained for some time. Eventually, the lifts had to be serviced by the 
council. Further more, since air-conditioning is centralized up to the third 
floor (including the premises of the supermarket), many businesses were 
affected when the centralized air-conditioning failed. As they were dissatisfied 
with the episodes, some tenants in the complex left to continue their business 
elsewhere.
To avoid further grievances to all parties, BPMC and other tenants have 
successfully negotiated with the developer to reinstate electricity supply. 
The council facilitated and encouraged the tenants to pay up arrears to the 
developer to help address the problems faced. However, it is unclear whether 
the council paid its portion to ABEEI.
One interesting aspect in this exercise is that the council allowed the 
developer to mortgage the land to secure a loan facility from a commercial 
bank to finance the development of the property. Following the national 
policy, 30 per cent of the shop lots were to be allotted to Bumiputeras. The 
exercise also allowed the developer to enter into sale of units under the Strata 
Titles Act 1985. 
The third problem arose when it was learnt that the developer had mort-
gaged the title a second time to refinance their loan facility. The council takes 
the view that it cannot be held responsible if the developer goes bankrupt or 
if there are any default payments. BPMC filed a civil suit in 2004 demanding 
the developer to settle or service the mortgage, and return the document of 
the said land to BPMC free from any encumbrances. ABEEI obliged and the 
document has since been returned to BPMC.
The council also faced another problem with third parties. The former 
bus station and taxi stand as well as the 30-odd food stalls belonging to the 
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council were offered a temporary site at Jalan Omar during the redevelopment 
process of the complex. Upon completion of the new complex, some of the 
stall operators at Jalan Omar refused to move to the new complex. Apparently, 
those who chose to remain, benefited more than those who returned to the 
complex.
This case is an example of risks in a PPP exercise, but the problem is 
in the manner with which the exercise was initiated and weaknesses in the 
selection process. The selection of the developer was not done via an open 
tender and it is not known whether the background of the developer was 
thoroughly investigated. KMC performed this task very diligently. The risk 
posed by the BPMC case is that the council is likely to take on the burden 
of administering and maintaining the facility in the future, thus, concurring 
with the views of Grimsey and Lewis (2004). The soured relationship has 
already indicated that the developer is unwilling to pursue further with his 
responsibilities, and it is believed that this relationship will not last. BPMC 
has also allowed the developer to mortgage the land – a move which KMC 
carefully refrained from. However, the fault should not be placed on the 
developer alone. BPMC had in the first place breached the contract by not 
paying the management fee. The developer merely retaliated when he refused 
to pay dues to the council and defaulted payment to utility companies. The 
situation is somewhat complex as this facility has units that have been sold 
to private individuals; the souring of the relationship between the council and 
ABEEI has also affected them. They were saved in time by the Commissioner 
of Building Act, 2008 which brought together all concerned parties in 
managing the asset. The experience in BPMC has in fact led to fear among 
other local councils in Johor in PPP dealings.
The undertaking is very different from Kuantan’s. The BPMC did not 
enter into a guarantee to be placed with the local authority, proceeds were 
not deposited into a common account to be signed by both parties in the PPP 
exercise, and there was no indication of penalties if there were delays in the 
construction of the facility.
5.  Discussion
As only three cases are discussed, it may be inappropriate to generalize on the 
findings. However, the paper sheds some light on some of the pertinent issues 
in relation to the partnership exercise, in particular the PPP, involving local 
authorities in the country. The three examples have shown that there is no need 
to depend on public expenditure to involve the private sector on joint ventures 
that would benefit all parties involved. Although this can be considered a way 
of saving taxpayer’s money, a broader picture is that it incorporates the role 
of the private sector in economic development at the local level, and there is 
IJIE vol2-2 Kuppusamy.indd   160 8/20/2010   1:30:53 PMPPP – Local Government and Private Sector in Malaysia      161
certainly a significant role played by local authorities in creating economic 
spin-offs. It has been common that such initiatives were more embodied within 
the scope of the federal government. Despite that, not all local authorities 
undertake this exercise. Kuantan has been a proven case and is a very popular 
destination for practitioners of PPP. In Johor, even among the larger local 
authorities where leadership, skills and expertise co-exist, not many local 
authorities undertake PPP. In fact, it has been noted that local authorities in 
Johor were sceptical of the potentials of PPP. The problem faced by Batu 
Pahat is often mentioned by the leaders of other local authorities in the state 
as one of the reasons why they would not opt for PPP. The situation in other 
local authorities across the country is however unclear.
PPP has been equated to the term “marriage” in this paper, and this is 
warranted looking at the experience that appears to both extremes. While 
KMC and BPMC, both local authorities of almost equal status, have decided 
to get “married”, the experience of the former illustrates a successful marriage 
while the latter has ceased to work. Therefore, what made the marriage work 
or otherwise needs further examination.
Unlike in Batu Pahat, both the cases in Kuantan did not involve giving 
up of land titles, thus, there was no mortgaging involved. All financial 
matters were purely dependent on the financial strength of the developer. 
The initiatives would have failed if the financial background of the developer 
was poor. Whatsoever the case may be, KMC still holds the title to the land, 
therefore there would be no possibility of financial institutions taking legal 
action to claim ownership of the land or the property given the operator 
continues to default payment. The mortgage process in Batu Pahat has led 
to the developer having an extra edge to default payment, likely leading to 
a situation where the council would end up losing the land and the premise 
to the banker. Today, KMC still holds to the strong belief that the land 
title should never be ceded to the developer. This appears to be the major 
difference between both cities in their implementation of PPP. 
The case in Kuantan appears to be more balanced in sharing respon-
sibilities, but more lopsided in Batu Pahat. The former is called “strong PPP” 
and the latter “weak PPP” following Van Boxmeer and Van Beckhoven’s 
(2005) description of PPP. Strong PPP is one that has equal involvement of 
both parties and one in which decisions and powers are shared; this is the 
opposite in a weak PPP. Following Grimsey and Lewis (2004) and Li et al. 
(2005), Batu Pahat is a good example to show the risks that are involved, 
especially in the post construction management process and the likely long 
term unexpected challenge to public sector. 
As mentioned earlier, there were striking features in Kuantan where the 
leadership had played an important if not the most significant role in leading 
the initiatives with courage and wisdom. The leadership of the council 
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was known to have been so exemplary that subsequently, in addition to 
other accolades, the president was made the Director General of the Local 
Government Department, Ministry of Housing and Local Government. Like 
in Kuantan, leadership was said to be the driving force in Batu Pahat in 
introducing PPP. Internally, the introduction of PPP was not easy as there 
was a need to convince the Full Board meeting of the local authority and 
the staff to accept the new paradigm of PPP which was initiated alongside 
the introduction of ISO9000.7 It involved a series of painstaking efforts in 
planning, meetings, consultations and negotiations which required full support 
from the management, otherwise the exercise would not have materialized. 
Therefore, transparency in the process was evident as advocated by Hodge 
and Greve (2007). Kuantan has provided proof that a complete and continuous 
follow-through is ultimately necessary in ensuring that the “marriage” 
works. The cooperation and contribution of various levels of individuals 
at the KMC was vital. Frequent meetings held among the staff were also 
required to examine the status of the initiative and in identifying bottlenecks. 
Some of these aspects also existed in Batu Pahat. The cases examined 
showed greater commitment of various parties in ensuring the success of the 
initiative in Kuantan than in Batu Pahat, which is also consistent with the 
recommendations put forth by Hodge and Greve (2007) and Li et al. (2005).
The Kuantan experience reveals that local authorities should behave in 
a manner that would be conducive to enhance good relationship with the 
partners in PPP. Batu Pahat has taken it somewhat quite to the opposite, and 
there was a tussle between both parties involved in settling payments to each 
other. This has led to one partner blaming the other, and the tenants, business 
operators as well as the customers patronizing the complex being redefined as 
the victims from the standoff. In the marriage within PPP, a softer approach 
in communication is vital. In other words, PPP is a long term relationship and 
depending solely on an agreement per se may not work. Batu Pahat has seen 
the divorce between the council and the developer. Sustaining the relationship 
would require perseverance, cooperation, helping-out, good communication, 
support of various parties, and also experience (Hodge and Greve, 2007). 
Learning from the experience of others is also vital. 
PPP may not mean anything to petty traders. What matters to them is 
the success of their businesses. The case in Kuantan showed that moving the 
petty traders while a new set of hawking facilities were built did not receive 
objections like the case in Batu Pahat. At the latter, a number of petty traders 
refused to return back to their original site as the temporary site turned to be 
a more strategic location. Likewise, the term PPP did not carry any weight 
for the general resident. In fact, the residents could not even understand 
the meaning of it even if it was advertised as required on the sign postings 
informing the public about the project. To the residents, it does not matter 
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whether the facilities were provided under privatization, out-sourcing, PPP, 
contracting-out or any other terms. Like the petty traders mentioned above, 
what matters to them is that the services provided should benefit them and it 
does not matter who provided them and through which means.
6.  Conclusions
With regards to local government’s effort in getting the private sector to 
participate towards inducing development, this paper has discussed a few 
points as lessons for all parties concerned, especially local governments 
elsewhere around the world. The paper has also shown that PPP is workable 
and would benefit both parties, let alone the urban residents. A point to note 
is that land ownership by the local government is essential to allow for PPP in 
real estate development. Some local governments may not possess the sizeable 
land that is required – at least one to three hectares. Hence it is pertinent 
that interested local governments identify land for this sort of exercise. In 
Malaysia, local authorities may persistently apply for land banks from state 
governments to be given to them as part of the state government’s social 
responsibility to the citizens. Otherwise, local governments should consider 
purchasing land now for future use which would prove to be beneficial in the 
long run.
For local governments that have land banks, the cases shown are 
sufficient to take cognizance of the fact that land title should not be allowed to 
be mortgaged by the partnership as collateral for financial assistance. The case 
in Batu Pahat has shown adverse effects when the land was mortgaged twice 
and the council had to resort to take legal recourse to retrieve the land title.
In carrying out and implementing successful PPP, leadership and full 
commitment of the management is absolutely necessary. In addition, leader-
ship should be retained on a long term basis, otherwise successors should 
ensure that the PPP initiated before their term of office continues to work 
during their tenure. Leadership is very important in local governments as 
subordinates will not react if there is no clear guidance from the new leader. 
Absence of clear leadership support would prove the PPP exercise to be futile 
and a waste of resources. Once these elements are there, it is also important 
that a good relationship is fostered between both parties, akin a marriage 
where communication, understanding and tolerance is ultimately required. No 
party in PPP should behave in such a way as to show one is more dominant 
than the other.
Finally, it is important that local governments understand the difficulties 
faced by the partners in PPP. Local government leadership should be prepared 
to negotiate anytime during the concession period to be of assistance to their 
partners in the private sector. This would not only reduce the private partner’s 
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difficulties, but also, increases their trust and spirit of “partnership”. These 
elements have not been identified as important in the literature (Hodge and 
Greve, 2007). In general, the major benefits of PPP are greater involvement 
of the private sector in the provision of public services; reduced public 
expenditure; and greater risk-taking by the private sector partners and 
increase in revenue and physical assets to the local government.
Notes
1.    The writer would like to thank Dato’ Mohamad bin Saib from Kuantan, Hj. 
Amran bin A. Rahman, the current president of BPMC and Mr. Jalaluddin Haron 
of the Valuation and Asset Management Department of BPMC, all of whom 
who shared their experiences with him. He also appreciates the assistance of the 
FS112/2008B research grant provided by the University of Malaya.
2.    In current terms, the government does not favour direct negotiations as it has 
received numerous public outcries over such arrangements in the past.
3.    The federal government has just finalized and approved the posts for Commis-
sioner of Building to be placed at the local authorities. 
4.    It is common that the management fee is significantly larger than the assessment 
tax for a multi-storey property.
5.    The units were empty before 2006.
6.    Tenants are supplied with individual meters. Common areas include walkways, 
air-conditioning, escalators, lifts, restrooms.
7.    Coincidentally, quality accreditation and PPP took place with the intention to 
completely revamp the way the local authority was providing urban services. 
Serious involvement of the local authority in enhancing as well as supporting eco-
nomic development was imperative. Paying attention to one aspect and neglecting 
the other was not practical in the long run to sustaining positive results.
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